Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2125110
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01370-7zbMath1484.91165arXiv2006.14045MaRDI QIDQ2125110
Publication date: 13 April 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.14045
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