A sequential selection game with vetoes

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006zbMath1197.91043MaRDI QIDQ844901

Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan, Steven Alpern

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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