A sequential selection game with vetoes

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.05.006zbMATH Open1197.91043OpenAlexW2121952996MaRDI QIDQ844901FDOQ844901

Authors Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan, Steve Alpern

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

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• Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
• Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games
• Monotonicity of power and power measures
• ON A multi-person time-sequential game with priorities
• On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states
• Optimal Challenges for Selection
• Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
• Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
• Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
• Recursive Repeated Games with Absorbing States
• Stochastic Games
• The donation paradox for peremptory challenges
• Who solved the secretary problem

Cited in

(8)

• The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting
• A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players
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• Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
• Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information
• Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
• Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
• Equilibrium informativeness in veto games

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