A sequential selection game with vetoes
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Publication:844901
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006zbMath1197.91043OpenAlexW2121952996MaRDI QIDQ844901
Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan, Steven Alpern
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006
Related Items (6)
Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond ⋮ A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players ⋮ Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information ⋮ The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting ⋮ Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem ⋮ Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
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