A sequential selection game with vetoes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844901
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.05.006zbMATH Open1197.91043OpenAlexW2121952996MaRDI QIDQ844901FDOQ844901
Authors: Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan, Steve Alpern
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Stochastic Games
- On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Recursive Repeated Games with Absorbing States
- Who solved the secretary problem
- Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
- Monotonicity of power and power measures
- Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games
- Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
- Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
- Optimal Challenges for Selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
- The donation paradox for peremptory challenges
- ON A multi-person time-sequential game with priorities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (7)
- Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
- A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players
- Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
- Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
- Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information
- The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting
- Title not available (Why is that?)
This page was built for publication: A sequential selection game with vetoes
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q844901)