Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges

DOI10.1287/opre.26.6.966zbMath0413.90035OpenAlexW2129125089MaRDI QIDQ3048564

Steven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.6.966

zbMATH Keywords

game-theoretic modeloptimal jury selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Related Items (4)

A sequential selection game with vetoes ⋮ An experimental study of storable votes ⋮ Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information ⋮ Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem

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