An experimental study of storable votes
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Publication:863272
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004zbMath1151.91413DBLPjournals/geb/CasellaGP06OpenAlexW3122140195WikidataQ56873871 ScholiaQ56873871MaRDI QIDQ863272
Alessandra Casella, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9982.pdf
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An experimental study of storable votes ⋮ An experimental study of voting with costly delay ⋮ A simple mechanism for resolving conflict ⋮ Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria ⋮ Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. ⋮ One man, one bid ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Storable votes ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
Cites Work
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- An experimental study of storable votes
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Storable votes
- Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
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