Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.07.001MaRDI QIDQ536079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Alessandra Casella

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

votingcheap talkexperimentscommitteesagendastorable votes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
• An experimental study of storable votes
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Comparative cheap talk
• Deliberative voting
• Equilibrium agenda formation
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Storable votes
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis

Cited in

(3)

• An experimental study of storable votes
• Storable votes
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes

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