Storable votes

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.009zbMATH Open1099.91038DBLPjournals/geb/Casella05OpenAlexW4239451970WikidataQ56873870 ScholiaQ56873870MaRDI QIDQ2485488FDOQ2485488

Authors: Alessandra Casella 

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.009

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zbMATH Keywords

CommitteesVoting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• An experimental study of storable votes

Cited In (29)

• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
• Social Choice Theory
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Multi-attribute proportional representation
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Implementing direct democracy via representation
• Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
• Minority voting and long-term decisions
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Dealing with expert bias in collective decision-making
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Discounted quotas
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Balanced voting
• Repeated delegation
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Markets for public decision-making
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Inefficiencies on linking decisions
• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• One man, one bid

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