Storable votes
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Publication:2485488
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(29)- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
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- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
- Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
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