An experimental study of voting with costly delay

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.12.019MaRDI QIDQ1668140zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maksymilian Kwiek, Helia Marreiros, Michael Vlassopoulos

Publication date 3 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/385515/1/EL_Resubmission.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingwar of attritionsupermajorityintensity of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
• An experimental study of storable votes
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
• Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation

Cites work

• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• Storable votes

Cited in

(3)

• The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Optimal policymaking under yardstick vote: an experimental study

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