An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
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Publication:900611
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.008zbMath1330.91069OpenAlexW2039213570MaRDI QIDQ900611
Tilman Börgers, Katalin Bognar, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.008
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Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design, The price of `one person, one vote', The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
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