The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105228MaRDI QIDQ2044979zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada

Publication date 11 August 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105228

zbMATH Keywords

electionspivotal votingprivate valuereferendaturnout

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Review text

The authors consider a game-theoretic model of voting, where the voters have to bear some cost when they decide to cast a vote, and one of the two candidates (alternatives) is handicapped in the sense that a handicapped candidate needs to gather some extra votes to win with an opponent. It turns out that for a large handicap (relatively to the cost of voting) the strategy that the voters abstain from voting is in equilibrium (called the no-show equilibrium), while for a small handicap other strategies can be in equilibrium (either coexisting with the no-show equilibrium, or ruling it out). The extensions of the basic model, like introducing partisan voters (no-cost voters), variable cost among voters' preferences and multiple candidates, are shortly addressed as well. As an application of the presented theory the assessment voting is proposed. It is a two-stage voting, where a potentially small assessment group of randomly chosen voters participates in a pre-voting, next the outcome of this pre-voting is made public and finally the whole population of voters (excluding assessment group) is allowed to add their votes to the pre-voting pool of votes. Under suitable assumptions, the outcome of the assessment voting procedure is in agreement with the outcome of the pre-voting. The article includes a thorough discussion of the existing body of literature; current examples from politics are brought to the reader's attention.

Recommendations

• Coordination and turnout in large elections
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large elections and interim turnout
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation
• Voting as a signaling device

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Cited in

(4)

• Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
• Large elections and interim turnout
• A model of electoral behaviour
• Representative committees of peers

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