Voting as a signaling device

DOI10.1007/S00199-013-0764-0MaRDI QIDQ2447162zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Emre Aytimur, Aristotelis Boukouras, Robert Schwager

Publication date 24 April 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/9338555/ABS_voting_as_signal_Accepted_Manuscript_2_.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingsignalingsocial interactionturnoutelectoral incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Civic duty and political advertising
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• Voting as a signaling device
• Welfare reducing polls

Cited in

(20)

• Voting to tell others
• Turnout intention and random social networks
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
• Vote or Shout
• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• A passion for voting
• Voting and social pressure under imperfect information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943496 (Why is no real title available?)
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• Voting as a signaling device
• Political mobilization in the laboratory: the role of norms and communication
• The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice
• Altruism, noise, and the paradox of voter turnout: an experimental study
• A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action

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