Voting as a signaling device
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(20)- Voting to tell others
- Turnout intention and random social networks
- A signaling model of repeated elections
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
- Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
- Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
- Vote or Shout
- Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- A passion for voting
- Voting and social pressure under imperfect information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943496 (Why is no real title available?)
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Voting as a signaling device
- Political mobilization in the laboratory: the role of norms and communication
- The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice
- Altruism, noise, and the paradox of voter turnout: an experimental study
- A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
- Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
- A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action
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