Voting as a signaling device
The authors continue the study of a model of voter behavior based on the idea that choosing to vote (or not) can influence one's later interactions with others, and thus can provide indirect benefits beyond merely the opportunity to affect the outcome of the election. (See the authors' earlier paper of the same name, [``Voting as a signaling device, CESifo Working Paper No. 3700 (2007); \url{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990199}] for an initial version of this model). The authors discuss some of the dynamics predicted by the model for rational actors, finding that several of the predictions agree with empirical findings. Most importantly, in this model, the paradox of not voting arises less often, since the value of voting due to signaling rises as the population increases, counteracting the loss of value that comes from having a lower chance of influencing the outcome. Under certain conditions, the model also predicts the ``bandwagon effect, where one's willingness to vote increases as the expected participation rate rises. The authors also discuss the impact of signaling on the volatility of voter turnout, suggesting that it is easier to increase turnout in close-knit communities where the cost of later interactions is lower, increasing their value.
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
- The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice
- Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
- Political mobilization in the laboratory: the role of norms and communication
- Altruism, noise, and the paradox of voter turnout: an experimental study
- A passion for voting
- A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action
- Voting as a signaling device
- Vote or Shout
- Turnout intention and random social networks
- Voting to tell others
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943496 (Why is no real title available?)
- A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
- Voting and social pressure under imperfect information
- Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
- Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- A signaling model of repeated elections
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