Voting as a signaling device

DOI10.1007/S00199-013-0764-0MaRDI QIDQ2447162zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Emre Aytimur, Aristotelis Boukouras, Robert Schwager

Publication date 24 April 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/9338555/ABS_voting_as_signal_Accepted_Manuscript_2_.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

electoral incentivessignalingsocial interactionturnoutvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Voting as Communicating
• Voting
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• Voting to tell others
• A note on voting
• Voting in the limelight
• Voting and power
• Voting and vagueness

Cites work

• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Civic duty and political advertising
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• Voting as a signaling device
• Welfare reducing polls

Cited in

(20)

• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
• The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice
• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
• Political mobilization in the laboratory: the role of norms and communication
• Altruism, noise, and the paradox of voter turnout: an experimental study
• A passion for voting
• A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action
• Voting as a signaling device
• Vote or Shout
• Turnout intention and random social networks
• Voting to tell others
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943496 (Why is no real title available?)
• A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
• Voting and social pressure under imperfect information
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• A signaling model of repeated elections

This page was built for publication: Voting as a signaling device

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2447162)