A signaling model of repeated elections

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0129-8zbMATH Open1138.91388OpenAlexW2071470949MaRDI QIDQ862541FDOQ862541

Authors: Kenneth W. Shotts 

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8

Recommendations

• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Voting as a signaling device

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Voting as Communicating

Cited In (10)

• Pandering and electoral competition
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• Voting with preferences over margins of victory
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

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