A signaling model of repeated elections

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0129-8MaRDI QIDQ862541zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kenneth W. Shotts

Publication date 24 January 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Voting as a signaling device

Cites work

• Large Poisson games
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Voting as Communicating

Cited in

(10)

• Voting with preferences over margins of victory
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

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