Population uncertainty and Poisson games

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1972595

DOI10.1007/s001820050079zbMath0943.91003OpenAlexW2039968104MaRDI QIDQ1972595

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1102.pdf



Related Items

Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players, Poisson voting games under proportional rule, Random-player games, Private provision of discrete public goods, Robust rational turnout, An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens, Public information and electoral bias, MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH POPULATION UNCERTAINTY, The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information, Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games, Coordination and turnout in large elections, Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule, A signaling model of repeated elections, The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games, Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain, Population uncertainty and revealing contestants, Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game, A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs, Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence, The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures, Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule, Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections, The Simplest Unlimited-Player Game of Skill, Contact tracing \& super-spreaders in the branching-process model, Strategic stability in Poisson games, Large elections and interim turnout, Poisson-Cournot games, On the Impact of Vote Delegation, Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games, Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences, On dynamic games with randomly arriving players, The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population, Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions, Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate, Evolutionary aspects of spatial prisoner's dilemma in a population modeled by continuous probabilistic cellular automata and genetic algorithm., Contests between groups of unknown size, Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility, Volunteering under population uncertainty, Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory, On the impact of information disclosure on advance reservations: a game-theoretic view, Unanimous rules in the laboratory, Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse, Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty, Voluntary voting: costs and benefits, Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games, The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions, Auctions with an inexpert bidder, Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions, A model of pre-electoral coalition formation, A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model, Price competition with population uncertainty, Pivots versus signals in elections, The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting, A busy period approach to some queueing games, Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations, Approval Voting in Large Electorates, Contests with a stochastic number of players, A model of parallel contests, Atomic congestion games with random players: network equilibrium and the price of anarchy, Large Poisson games, Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games