A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.11.003MaRDI QIDQ2286934zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yutaka Sakuma, Emiko Fukuda, Hiroyuki Masuyama

Publication date 23 January 2020

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.07326

zbMATH Keywords

agent-based modelgeneral service timeNash equilibriumnoncooperative queueing gamePoissonian populationqueueing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Abstract: This paper considers a discrete-time single-server queue with a single acceptance period for a Poissonian population of homogeneous customers. Customers are served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis, and their service times are independent and identically distributed with a general distribution. We assume that each customer chooses her/his arrival-time slot with the goal of minimizing her/his expected waiting time in competition with other customers. For this queueing game, we derive a symmetric (mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium; that is, an equilibrium arrival-time distribution of homogeneous customers, where their expected waiting times are identical. We also propose an agent-based model, which simulates the dynamics of customers who try to minimize their waiting times for service. Through numerical experiments, we confirm that this agent-based model achieves, in steady state, an arrival-time distribution similar to the equilibrium arrival-time distribution analytically obtained.

Recommendations

• Strategic arrivals to a queue with service rate uncertainty
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions
• Strategic timing of arrivals to a finite queue multi-server loss system
• Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties
• The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late

Cites work

• ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals
• Characterizations of discrete compound Poisson distributions
• Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions
• Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Rational queueing
• Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence
• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs

Cited in

(6)

• Strategic arrivals to a queue with service rate uncertainty
• Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties
• Choosing a batch to be processed
• A numerically stable formula for the conditional distribution of the residual service time in the M_n / P H / 1 queue
• Analysis of functional equations in M/G/1 queueing-system
• Arrival timing game for future limited items and full capacity announcement

This page was built for publication: A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2286934)