Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4zbMath1349.91090OpenAlexW1586160896MaRDI QIDQ339921

Lars Peter Østerdal, Alexander Sebald, Jesper Breinbjerg

Publication date: 11 November 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutter/ivoe/disc_papers/disc_2014/dpbe12_2014.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessequilibriumexperimentscongestionqueue disciplines

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties, Choosing a batch to be processed, Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions, The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline, A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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