Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions

DOI10.1007/S10683-005-0872-1zbMATH Open1137.90430OpenAlexW3124389036MaRDI QIDQ816754FDOQ816754

Authors: Darryl A. Seale, James E. Parco, William Stein, Amnon Rapoport 

Publication date: 23 February 2006

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0872-1

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentcoordinationequilibrium solutionbatch queueing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Cites Work

• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals

Cited In (11)

• Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
• Joining the right queue: a state-dependent decision rule
• Managing capacity at a service facility: an experimental approach
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions
• Choosing a batch to be processed
• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
• Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence
• Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties
• A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model
• Comparison of customer balking and reneging behavior to queueing theory predictions: An experimental study
• Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study

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