Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue

DOI10.1007/S10479-023-05348-9zbMATH Open1543.9007MaRDI QIDQ6573320FDOQ6573320

Authors: Jesper Breinbjerg, Trine Tornøe Platz, Lars Peter Østerdal 

Publication date: 16 July 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

queueingNash equilibriumstrategic arrivalsFCFSLCFS-PR

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues: the case of heterogeneous customers
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• Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties
• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
• Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times
• Strategic timing of arrivals to a finite queue multi-server loss system
• The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late
• Random queues and risk averse users
• Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study
• Rational queueing
• The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline
• Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence
• Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions

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