The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016zbMath1394.91118OpenAlexW3121462467MaRDI QIDQ324143

Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016

zbMATH Keywords

costly votingmixed strategy equilibriumparticipation gamespolynomials in Bernstein form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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