Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations
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Publication:739333
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039zbMath1343.91035OpenAlexW2160994892WikidataQ50886703 ScholiaQ50886703MaRDI QIDQ739333
Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña, Laurent Lehmann
Publication date: 18 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_356141BB97F7
Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (15)
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