Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039zbMath1343.91035OpenAlexW2160994892WikidataQ50886703 ScholiaQ50886703MaRDI QIDQ739333

Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña, Laurent Lehmann

Publication date: 18 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_356141BB97F7

zbMATH Keywords

inclusive fitnessrelatedness\(n\)-player gamesgames between relatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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