Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.023zbMath1343.92566OpenAlexW2952128866WikidataQ47348540 ScholiaQ47348540MaRDI QIDQ304731

Jorge Peña, Georg Nöldeke

Publication date: 26 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0029-2182-D

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic ordersreplicator dynamicsevolutionary game theorypublic goods games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

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