Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
chaotic dynamicsdynamic gamedynamical systemsecosystemsevolutionary gamesgeneticshomotopyHopf bifurcationLyapunov functionsmulti-agent gamepopulation dynamicsstable equilibria
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to biology (92-02) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)
The monograph under review displays a mathematical analysis of population dynamics in ecosystems. The models and equations which are examined reflect a game theoretic approach, that is, each species acts as if it participates in a multi-agent game, and the species which we observe are those that survive. The mathematics portrays much more than survival, as the possible dynamics resulting out of the behavioral strategies are outcome of the models. Before delving into the details of the models, it should be noted that the authors did an excellent job in the presentation. Enlightening comments relate the mathematical models and derivations to the reality they depict. Comments on the history of the subject accompany the text, and extensive references to the literature enable to complete the picture. New results are displayed along with the classical analysis of the subject. Exercises provide the newcomers the possibility to test their understanding. The text is addressed to both mathematicians and biologists (and social scientists interested in the sociology of species). The conclusions concerning ecology are given through mathematical eyeglasses, and thus proficiency in the mathematical vocabulary is required. For most of the text the mathematical prerequisites are advanced calculus, linear algebra and basic differential equations. At some points higher level is of help, for instance when concepts like Hopf bifurcation and homotopy are introduced and employed. The first part of the text examines dynamical systems on a finite-dimensional space, where each coordinate represents a species. Thus, the chapter offers glance at differential equations, concentrating on equations which arise in population dynamics. The text points out the relations between the formulation of the equations and the reflected behaviour of the different species. The interpretation of characteristics of the resulting solutions is then examined. The equations and concepts analyzed in this category include the logistic equation, Lotka-Volterra systems, cooperative versus competitive systems, \(\omega\)-limit sets, Poincaré-Bendixson theorem, cyclic phenomena, chaotic dynamics. Part two introduces game-theoretic considerations. It starts with basic notions of games in normal form, and then shifts to the more involved framework of repeating and evolutionary games. The prime game theoretic concept in this framework is the Nash equilibrium, which is quite transparent when a game is finitely repeated, but its reflection on dynamic games is far from being agreed upon. The chapter offers little about classical game theory, and concentrates on the dynamical aspects. The text introduces and analyses notions of stable equilibria. Strategies leading to such equilibria are examined. Replicator dynamics, the relatively new development offered in the text, is a behavioral law within which the species try, roughly, to repeat evolutionary success. The text examines the effect of such dynamics in several situations. Other behavioral laws such the best response, adjustment rules and adaptive dynamics are examined. The latter concept is dealt with in detail, including prisoner dilemma like games in various situations. The third part concentrates on stability, and permanence. Stability is taken in the Lyapunov sense, namely that perturbations from, say, an equilibrium, that occur spontaneously, are corrected by the dynamics. Permanence reflects the possibility the trajectory may not lead to an equilibrium, yet it wonders in a region that allows for all the participating species to survive. These notions are examined in various ecological frameworks. The mathematics involves Lyapunov functions considerations, and linear algebra tools, like the Perron-Frobenius theorem. The last part displays issues specific to populations genetics. The mathematics here are more of a discrete type, introducing selection rules, mutation-selection, recombination arrangements, etc. Here the game theoretic aspects play a lesser role, although the dynamics in interpreted as resulting from applying mixed strategies.
- Turbulence in diffusion replicator equation
- Diagonal stability of matrices with cyclic structure and the secant condition
- Permanent coexistence in chemostat models with delayed feedback control
- On competitive Lotka-Volterra model in random environments
- Dynamical adaptation of parental care
- What evolutionary game theory tells us about multiagent learning
- Effect of small time delay in a predator-prey model within random environment
- On stability and dissipativity of some classes of complex systems
- Non-cooperative competition among revenue maximizing service providers with demand learning
- Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics
- Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
- The population dynamics of conflict and cooperation
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- Shaken not stirred: On permanence in ecological communities
- Predator-prey system with stage structure and delay.
- Coexistence for species sharing a predator.
- Selection and segregation distortion in a sex-differentiated population.
- Coexistence in MacArthur-style consumer-resource models.
- The dynamics of two diffusively coupled predator--prey populations.
- Stability analysis of the Kaldor model with time delays: monetary policy and government budget constraint
- Probabilities of extinction, weak extinction permanence, and mutual exclusion in discrete, competitive, Lotka-Volterra systems
- Multistability and path dependence in a dynamic brand competition model
- Criteria for \(C^r\) robust permanence
- Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
- The stage-structured predator-prey model and optimal harvesting policy
- A predator-prey model with predators using hawk and dove tactics
- Numerical bifurcation analysis of a tri-trophic food web with omnivory
- Genetic models for plant pathosystems
- On persistence and stability of some spatially inhomogeneous systems
- Spatial self-organization in three-component mixtures
- Two limit cycles in three-dimensional Lotka-Volterra systems
- A simple evolutionary game arising from the study of the role of IGF-II in pancreatic cancer
- Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory
- Strategy abundance in 2 2 games for arbitrary mutation rates
- Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
- Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
- Learning process in public goods games
- Stochastic Lotka-Volterra equations: a model of lagged diffusion of technology in an interconnected world
- Cooperative behavior and phase transitions in co-evolving stag hunt game
- Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation
- Promotion of cooperation induced by heterogeneity of both investment and payoff allocation in spatial public goods game
- Learning and sparse control of multiagent systems
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
- Riemannian game dynamics
- Adaptation of prey and predators between patches
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
- Strategy selection in structured populations
- Community assembly, stability and signatures of dynamical constraints on food web structure
- Disentangling eco-evolutionary effects on trait fixation
- Spontaneous behavioural changes in response to epidemics
- Replicator-dynamics models of sexual conflict
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Dynamics of a new delayed stage-structured predator-prey model with impulsive diffusion and releasing
- A predator-prey refuge system: evolutionary stability in ecological systems
- From discrete to continuous evolution models: a unifying approach to drift-diffusion and replicator dynamics
- Fluctuation domains in adaptive evolution
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies
- The evolutionary path to terminal differentiation and division of labor in cyanobacteria
- CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces
- Global mutations and local mutations have very different effects on evolution, illustrated by mixed strategies of asymmetric binary games
- Computation of sparse and dense equilibrium strategies of evolutionary games
- Game theoretical model of cancer dynamics with four cell phenotypes
- Dominance and the maintenance of polymorphism in multiallelic migration-selection models with two demes
- Relative nonlinearity and permanence
- Dynamics of virus and immune response in multi-epitope network
- Dynamic Cournot duopoly games with nonlinear demand function
- The evolution of cooperation in spatial multigame with voluntary participation
- Synergy punishment promotes cooperation in spatial public good game
- Reputation-based coevolution of link weights promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- The optimal control for promoting the cooperation in evolution game generated by prisoner's dilemma
- Computation as social agency: what, how and who
- Choice disability as a target for non-medical HIV intervention
- Combination therapies and intra-tumoral competition: insights from mathematical modeling
- A guideline to study the feasibility domain of multi-trophic and changing ecological communities
- Predator-prey-subsidy population dynamics on stepping-stone domains with dispersal delays
- Robust permanence for ecological equations with internal and external feedbacks
- Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection
- Coevolution of nonlinear group interactions and strategies in well-mixed and structured populations
- Competition, trait-mediated facilitation, and the structure of plant-pollinator communities
- Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
- Discovering the effect of nonlocal payoff calculation on the stabilty of ESS: spatial patterns of Hawk-Dove game in metapopulations
- The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations
- Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
- Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game
- Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
- How to analyze models of nonlinear public goods
- Bifurcation mechanism design -- from optimal flat taxes to better cancer treatments
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- An integrated approach to evaluating sustainability in supply chains using evolutionary game theory
- An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game
- Rational conformity behavior can promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation
- Natural selection as coarsening
- Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the prisoner's dilemma game
- A convergence theorem for graph shift-type algorithms
- The impact of vaccine side effects on the natural history of immunization programmes: an imitation-game approach
- Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
- On arbitrarily long periodic orbits of evolutionary games on graphs
- Flows in \(\mathbb {R}^2_+\) without interior fixed points, global attractors and bifurcations
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