An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game

DOI10.1155/2017/8781570zbMath1487.91011arXiv1607.05192OpenAlexW3099973034WikidataQ59144307 ScholiaQ59144307MaRDI QIDQ1656144

Michael C. Haslam, Ikjyot Singh Kohli

Publication date: 10 August 2018

Published in: International Journal of Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.05192

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment

Cites Work

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• Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• On dynamical multi-team and signaling games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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