Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:831077
DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00339-7zbMATH Open1461.91046OpenAlexW2989963832MaRDI QIDQ831077FDOQ831077
Authors: Qiang Wang, Linjie Liu, Xiaojie Chen 
Publication date: 10 May 2021
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00339-7
Recommendations
- The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations
- Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
- Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game
- Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
- Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The calculus of selfishness.
- The replicator equation and other game dynamics
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
- Evolution of cooperation in the traveler's dilemma game on two coupled lattices
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
- Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Dynamical behaviors for vaccination can suppress infectious disease -- a game theoretical approach
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Fundamentals of evolutionary game theory and its applications
- Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
- Generalized social dilemmas: the evolution of cooperation in populations with variable group size
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game
- The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour involving simultaneous decisions and variable investment levels
- A two-phenotype model of immune evasion by cancer cells
- Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: the owner-intruder game
- Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks
- Minmax via replicator dynamics
- Unlimited niche packing in a Lotka-Volterra competition game
- Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
- Evolutionary stability and the evolution of cooperation on heterogeneous graphs
- The effect of the stake size on the evolution of fairness
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
Cited In (10)
- Analysis of dynamic evolution process of the N-player division of labor game model
- Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games
- Rational conformity behavior in social learning promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise
- Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk
- Replicator dynamics for involution in an infinite well-mixed population
- Green-beard effect predicts the evolution of traitorousness in the two-tag prisoner's dilemma
- Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- Payoff-based probabilistic interaction model on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q831077)
