Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
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Publication:2008513
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2018.11.029zbMath1429.91086arXiv1812.03479OpenAlexW2900861343WikidataQ128818747 ScholiaQ128818747MaRDI QIDQ2008513
Nanrong He, Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Publication date: 26 November 2019
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.03479
Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cites Work
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