Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2018.11.029MaRDI QIDQ2008513zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Nanrong He, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Publication date 26 November 2019

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.03479

zbMATH Keywords

common resourcecooperationmonitoringpunishmentreporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Abstract: Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To explore their possible interactions we consider spatially structured population where individuals face the collective-risk social dilemma. In our minimal model cooperator players report defection according to the loss of their interests. In parallel we assume a monitoring institution that monitors all group member and identifies wrong behavior with a certain probability. In response to these feedbacks a sanctioning institution develops punishment schemes by imposing fines on related defector players stochastically. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the introduction of monitoring and reporting mechanisms can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation and there exists a sudden change of the cooperation level by varying model parameters, which can lead to an outbreak of cooperation for solving the collective-risk social dilemma.

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Cited in

(26)

• Mercenary punishment in structured populations
• Heterogeneous donation game in geographical small-world networks
• Emergency evacuation dynamics in complex configurations
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• Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism
• Environmental feedback in spatial public goods game
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• Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
• Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism
• Effects of three-faced strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
• Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games
• Context-sensitive norm enforcement reduces sanctioning costs in spatial public goods games
• Research on monitoring mechanism of autonomous taxi: an evolutionary game approach
• Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment

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