Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
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Publication:2296981
DOI10.1007/s11071-019-05010-9zbMath1431.91033OpenAlexW2951984431WikidataQ127762764 ScholiaQ127762764MaRDI QIDQ2296981
Matjaž Perc, Xiaojie Chen, Linjie Liu
Publication date: 18 February 2020
Published in: Nonlinear Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-019-05010-9
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