Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2021.110887MaRDI QIDQ2137264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jialu He, Fengyuan Yu, Jianwei Wang

Publication date 16 May 2022

Published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110887

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneitycooperationindirect reciprocityevolutionary gameindividual influence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
• Learning continuous and consistent strategy promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game with mixed strategy
• Realistic decision-making process with memory and adaptability in evolutionary vaccination game
• Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves
• Statistical physics of human cooperation

Cited in

(15)

• Heterogeneous reputation promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
• Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
• Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
• Public goods game on coevolving networks driven by the similarity and difference of payoff
• Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game
• The emergence of cooperation in the context of prior agreement with threshold and posterior compensation
• The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan
• Ranking-randomness-mechanism promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
• The slow but persistent self-improvement boosts group cooperation
• The dynamic edge environment under interactive diversity is a double-edged sword
• The effects of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperation in spatial network
• Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups
• Impact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice
• The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma
• Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

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