Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2021.110887zbMATH Open1498.91097OpenAlexW3143049576MaRDI QIDQ2137264FDOQ2137264

Jianwei Wang, Jialu He, Fengyuan Yu

Publication date: 16 May 2022

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110887

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zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneitycooperationindirect reciprocityevolutionary gameindividual influence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
• Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves
• Learning continuous and consistent strategy promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game with mixed strategy
• Realistic decision-making process with memory and adaptability in evolutionary vaccination game

Cited In (13)

• Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
• Public goods game on coevolving networks driven by the similarity and difference of payoff
• Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game
• The emergence of cooperation in the context of prior agreement with threshold and posterior compensation
• Ranking-randomness-mechanism promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
• The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan
• The slow but persistent self-improvement boosts group cooperation
• The dynamic edge environment under interactive diversity is a double-edged sword
• The effects of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperation in spatial network
• Impact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice
• The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma
• Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Heterogeneous reputation promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

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