Statistical physics of human cooperation
DOI10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004zbMath1366.80006arXiv1705.07161OpenAlexW2618208446WikidataQ59900247 ScholiaQ59900247MaRDI QIDQ2364300
Matjaž Perc, Stefano Boccaletti, Jillian J. Jordan, Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, David G. Rand
Publication date: 18 July 2017
Published in: Physics Reports (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07161
Monte Carlo methods (65C05) Cooperative games (91A12) Interacting particle systems in time-dependent statistical mechanics (82C22) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Behavioral and social sciences (aspects of mathematics education) (97M70) Monte Carlo methods applied to problems in thermodynamics and heat transfer (80M31)
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