Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.012zbMath1447.91012OpenAlexW2098655416WikidataQ45951425 ScholiaQ45951425MaRDI QIDQ2202341

Robert L. Goldstone, Marco A. Janssen

Publication date: 18 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.012

zbMATH Keywords

group structureevolution of cooperationpublic good games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (12)

Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation ⋮ Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ A PDE model for protocell evolution and the origin of chromosomes via multilevel selection ⋮ Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games ⋮ Promotion of cooperation based on swarm intelligence in spatial public goods games ⋮ Cooperation in public goods game in populations of dynamic groups with varying evolution time scales ⋮ A two level mutation-selection model of cultural evolution and diversity ⋮ The evolution of altruism in spatial threshold public goods games via an insurance mechanism ⋮ The public goods game with a new form of shared reward ⋮ Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games ⋮ Relationship between aggregation of rewards and the possibility of polymorphism in continuous snowdrift games ⋮ Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility

Cites Work

• On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
• A theory of group selection.
• CHAOS IN COOPERATION: CONTINUOUS-VALUED PRISONER’S DILEMMAS IN INFINITE-VALUED LOGIC

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