Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148MaRDI QIDQ5033320zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Shinya Obayashi

Publication date 22 February 2022

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1371148

zbMATH Keywords

game theorygroup sizecollective reputationdynamics of collective action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
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Cites work

• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
• Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences
• Game theory
• Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work

Cited in

(3)

• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
• The weakness of strong ties: Collective action failure in a highly cohesive group*
• Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets

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