Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2017.1371148zbMATH Open1485.91013OpenAlexW2886544701WikidataQ129410427 ScholiaQ129410427MaRDI QIDQ5033320FDOQ5033320

Authors: Shinya Obayashi 

Publication date: 22 February 2022

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1371148

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorygroup sizecollective reputationdynamics of collective action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
• Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences

Cited In (3)

• Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets
• The weakness of strong ties: Collective action failure in a highly cohesive group*
• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms

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