A theory of group selection.

Cited In (55)

Tangled Nature: a model of emergent structure and temporal mode among co-evolving agents
The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay
Solving the prisoner's dilemma trap in Hamilton's model of temporarily formed random groups
Partner selection shapes the strategic and topological evolution of cooperation
Natural selection in compartmentalized environment with reshuffling
Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Network modularity promotes cooperation
Under multilevel selection: ``When shall you be neither spiteful nor envious?
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics on two levels
On Kin and Group Selection, and the Haystack Model
Mutual benefit can promote the evolution of preferential interactions and in this way can lead to the evolution of true altruism
Evolving cooperation
Understanding microbial cooperation
Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies
Transitions in evolution: a formal analysis
Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games
Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
Hamiltons rule in finite populations with synergistic interactions
Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
Darwinian selection and altruism
Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
Theories of kin and group selection: A population genetics perspective
On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas
Conditions for the evolution of altruism under Darwinian selection
Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive
Group-level events are catalysts in the evolution of cooperation
Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits: An ecogenetical approach
Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
The replicator dynamics for multilevel selection in evolutionary games
Group selection: the quest for social preferences
Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection
Effect of group selection on the evolution of altruistic behavior
Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups
The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness
Influence of bolstering network reciprocity in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game: a perspective
The generality of transient compartmentalization and its associated error thresholds
Multilevel mutation-selection systems and set-valued duals
When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts
An evolutionary game with revengers and sufferers on complex networks
Direct reciprocity and model-predictive strategy update explain the network reciprocity observed in socioeconomic networks
Worker-Queen conflict and the evolution of social insects
Role of perception cost in tag-mediated cooperation
Computer simulations of cellular group selection reveal mechanism for sustaining cooperation
Factors influencing the optimum sex ratio in a structured population
The evolution of group-beneficial traits in the absence of between-group selection

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