Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts

DOI10.1155/2017/9271651MaRDI QIDQ2012861zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Pilwon Kim

Publication date 3 August 2017

Published in Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationgroup-group conflictpopulation model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Review text

Summary: At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behavior that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as ``repositories of cooperation.

Recommendations

• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• The different cooperative behaviors on a kind of scale-free networks with identical degree sequence
• Natural selection of cooperation and degree hierarchy in heterogeneous populations
• Effect of self-organized interdependence between populations on the evolution of cooperation
• SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION IN COMPLEX NETWORKS

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A theory of group selection.
• Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: the public goods game
• Scale-Free Networks
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(3)

• The evolution of preferences for conflict
• Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
• Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

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