The evolution of preferences for conflict
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Publication:1925687
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.01.018zbMATH Open1253.91026OpenAlexW2024384983MaRDI QIDQ1925687FDOQ1925687
Publication date: 18 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.018
Cites Work
Cited In (5)
- An evolution-stable conflict-reducing mechanism with side payments
- Common-value contests with asymmetric information
- Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
- Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
- Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
Recommendations
- Evolutionary mechanism of conflict resolution π π
- Reputation and the evolution of conflict π π
- Evolution and ultimatum bargaining π π
- Evolution of Preferences1 π π
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
- Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts π π
- The population dynamics of conflict and cooperation π π
- Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict π π
- The dynamic evolution of preferences π π
- Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture π π
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