The evolution of preferences for conflict

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.01.018zbMATH Open1253.91026OpenAlexW2024384983MaRDI QIDQ1925687FDOQ1925687

Authors: Karl Wärneryd 

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.018

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zbMATH Keywords

conflictcontestpreference evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Information in conflicts.
• Contest success functions
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets.

Cited In (5)

• An evolution-stable conflict-reducing mechanism with side payments
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
• Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

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