The dynamic evolution of preferences

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7zbMath1137.91006OpenAlexW2118614669MaRDI QIDQ2373374

Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon, Yossef Spiegel

Publication date: 19 July 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7

zbMATH Keywords

limiting distributionsinterdependent preferencesoverconfidenceevolutionary dynamical gamesstability of evolutionary process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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