The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.001zbMath1099.91050MaRDI QIDQ1886748

Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric information; Toughness; Endowment effect; Evolution of preferences; Payoff-monotonic dynamics; Self-serving bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences, Market design with endogenous preferences, The commitment effect in belief evolution, What to maximize if you must, The dynamic evolution of preferences

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