The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.001zbMath1099.91050OpenAlexW3124172270MaRDI QIDQ1886748

Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationToughnessEndowment effectEvolution of preferencesPayoff-monotonic dynamicsSelf-serving bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

What to maximize if you must ⋮ The dynamic evolution of preferences ⋮ Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ Market design with endogenous preferences ⋮ The commitment effect in belief evolution ⋮ Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
• Preference evolution and reciprocity

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