Market design with endogenous preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.001zbMATH Open1151.91460OpenAlexW3122376464MaRDI QIDQ864892FDOQ864892

Authors: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, Eric Talley 

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1321

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zbMATH Keywords

market designendogenous preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• What to maximize if you must
• Preference evolution and reciprocity
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences
• A review of WTA/WTP studies
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Market Design
• Market design and the stability of general equilibrium
• Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments
• The optimal design of a market
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• What to maximize if you must
• Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers

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