Market design with endogenous preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.001MaRDI QIDQ864892zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, Eric Talley

Publication date 13 February 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1321

zbMATH Keywords

market designendogenous preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841887 (Why is no real title available?)
• A review of WTA/WTP studies
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• Game theory
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences
• Preference evolution and reciprocity
• Robust Mechanism Design
• The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• What to maximize if you must

Cited in

(7)

• What to maximize if you must
• Market Design
• The optimal design of a market
• Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments
• Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
• Market design and the stability of general equilibrium
• The dynamic evolution of preferences

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