Market design with endogenous preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:864892
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.001zbMath1151.91460MaRDI QIDQ864892
Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, Eric Talley
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1321
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
What to maximize if you must, The dynamic evolution of preferences, Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments
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