What to maximize if you must
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Publication:2370490
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.013zbMath1280.91051OpenAlexW3021147992MaRDI QIDQ2370490
Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon, Yossef Spiegel
Publication date: 26 June 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.013
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