Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response

DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0289-zzbMath1431.91031OpenAlexW2903048134MaRDI QIDQ2292121

Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date: 3 February 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0289-z

zbMATH Keywords

learningdynamic optimizationstrategic complementsstrategic substitutesstrategic teachingadaptive heuristicsmyopic players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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