Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response

DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0289-ZMaRDI QIDQ2292121zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date 3 February 2020

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0289-z

zbMATH Keywords

learningdynamic optimizationstrategic complementsstrategic substitutesstrategic teachingadaptive heuristicsmyopic players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games
• Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
• A two armed bandit type problem
• Repeated games with bonuses
• Learning equilibrium play: A myopic approach

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5301288 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 700091 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1153889 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
• Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
• Competitive equilibrium cycles
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Dynamic programming and optimal control. Vol. 1.
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models
• Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
• Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment
• Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On the indeterminacy of capital accumulation paths
• Potential games
• Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
• Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Sensitivity analysis of multisector optimal economic dynamics
• Simple adaptive strategies. From regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics. With the collaboration of Yakov Babichenko, Amotz Cahn, Yishay Mansour and David Schmeidler
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• Unbeatable imitation
• What to maximize if you must
• When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

Cited in

(2)

• A two armed bandit type problem
• Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games

This page was built for publication: Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2292121)