Best response dynamics with level-n expectations in two-stage games

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.01.019zbMATH Open1402.91030OpenAlexW3123101787MaRDI QIDQ1994422FDOQ1994422

Authors: Herbert Dawid, Dennis Heitmann 

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.01.019

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zbMATH Keywords

best response dynamicsmulti-stage gamesexpectation formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
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• Price stability and volatility in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback: an experimental investigation
• The heterogeneous expectations hypothesis: Some evidence from the lab
• Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate multiple production plants
• On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• A COMPETITION GAME WITH KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION AND SPILLOVERS
• A dynamic model of oligopoly with R\&D externalities along networks. I.
• A dynamic model of oligopoly with R\&D externalities along networks. II

Cited In (3)

• Equilibrium selection of a homogenous duopoly with extrapolative foresight
• Does local monopolistic approximation imply a less stable equilibrium?
• Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior?

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