Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
This research paper deals with the finite games of finite perfect information, a class of games in extensive form where the complete description is given, exactly specifying the rules, the order of moves, the information for the players and so on, under the assumption that the backward induction equilibrium is unique. The author presents the corresponding model, the associated population game and the evolutoinary dynamics significant main results, proofs and remarks, important connections with the existing references and possible extensions of the results established here: non-unique backward induction equilibrium, multiple agents and non-distinct populations, games with imperfect information, other selection dynamics, convergence and the order of limits.
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- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The logic of animal conflict
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- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- The geometry of inductive reasoning in games
- The evolution of exchange.
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- On the backward induction method
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- On a type of evolution of self-referred and hereditary phenomena
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Rule rationality
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Evolutionary game theory
- Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations and Backward Induction
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
- Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
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