Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226091 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
- Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Fictitious play in extensive form games
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- The logic of animal conflict
Cited in
(19)- Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games
- Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations and Backward Induction
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- On the backward induction method
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Rule rationality
- Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- On a type of evolution of self-referred and hereditary phenomena
- Evolutionary game theory
- The evolution of exchange.
- Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the matching pennies game
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1864824)
