Rule rationality
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Publication:2819286
DOI10.1111/IERE.12183zbMATH Open1404.91034OpenAlexW2556097037MaRDI QIDQ2819286FDOQ2819286
Authors: Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
Publication date: 28 September 2016
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12183
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