Rule rationality

DOI10.1111/IERE.12183MaRDI QIDQ2819286zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter

Publication date 28 September 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12183

zbMATH Keywords

gamesrule rationalityStackelberg stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(5)

• Categorization and cooperation across games
• Policy rules in practice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1304704 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6319038 (Why is no real title available?)
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs

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