Promises and endogenous reneging costs
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2173104
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105024zbMath1437.91100MaRDI QIDQ2173104
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78803/2/MPRA_paper_78803.pdf
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