Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
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Publication:2271098
DOI10.1007/s10683-008-9208-2zbMath1169.91331OpenAlexW2059425370MaRDI QIDQ2271098
Publication date: 6 August 2009
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9208-2
Related Items (29)
Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies ⋮ Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context ⋮ Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Lying with heterogeneous image concerns ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Delegation based on cheap talk ⋮ On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits ⋮ On the acceptance of apologies ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study ⋮ DO LIES ERODE TRUST? ⋮ Receiver's dilemma ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation ⋮ Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling ⋮ The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly messages ⋮ Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness ⋮ Lying and reciprocity ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Are people willing to tell Pareto white lies? A review and new experimental evidence ⋮ How do subjects view multiple sources of ambiguity? ⋮ Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
Cites Work
- Bare promises: an experiment
- Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
- An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
- Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- Strategic Information Transmission
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Maximization and the Act of Choice
- Promises and Partnership
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
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