Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
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Publication:719893
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.007zbMath1236.91041MaRDI QIDQ719893
Jan Potters, Marta Serra-Garcia, Eric E. C. van Damme
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/4b2421f3-f39c-4012-afef-d2c323fee7cd
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
91B18: Public goods
91B44: Economics of information
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
Related Items
Hiding opinions by minimizing disclosed information: an obfuscation-based opinion dynamics model, What goes around, comes around: experimental evidence on exposed lies, Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content, Communication-enhancing vagueness, Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis, Vagueness in multidimensional proposals, Delegation based on cheap talk
Uses Software
Cites Work
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