Communication-enhancing vagueness

DOI10.3390/g13040049zbMath1501.91026OpenAlexW4283360584MaRDI QIDQ2091705

Daniel H. Wood

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13040049

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsbounded rationalityvaguenesscheap talkhonestydeception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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• Intentional vagueness
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• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest

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