An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
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Publication:2460832
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014zbMath1271.91032MaRDI QIDQ2460832
Marc Vorsatz, Santiago Sánchez-Pagés
Publication date: 16 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A90: Experimental studies
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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