Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0892zbMATH Open1015.91510OpenAlexW3121212813MaRDI QIDQ700124FDOQ700124

Nick Feltovich, John Duffy

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5e46d7f249da5e099ddedd7676f607a40b0ee71e

Recommendations

• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
• Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games
• Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals
• A model of pre-game communication
• Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study
• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (28)

• The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games
• Competition fosters trust
• Communication and visibility in public goods provision
• Social distance in a virtual world experiment
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• The circulation of worthless tokens aids cooperation: an experiment inspired by the Kula
• COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
• Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
• Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
• Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
• The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
• MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• To catch a stag: identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games
• Authority and communication in the laboratory
• Intention or request: the impact of message structures
• Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
• Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
• Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task
• Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
• Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies
• Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
• Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
• Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others

This page was built for publication: Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700124)