What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.007zbMath1254.91085OpenAlexW2096976406WikidataQ57933927 ScholiaQ57933927MaRDI QIDQ1927511

Gary Charness, Brit Grosskopf

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

experimental methodologycoordinationcheap talkpayoff information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games, What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence, Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude, What to tell? Wise communication and wise crowd, Intention or request: the impact of message structures, Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations, Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment