Intention or request: the impact of message structures

DOI10.3390/G12010012MaRDI QIDQ2052492zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Siyu Wang, Timothy Flannery

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010012

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcommunicationexperimentlying aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Review text

Summary: This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor self-committing, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property.

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Cited in

(4)

• Experiments on communication in games: introduction to the special issue
• Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
• Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication
• How will generative AI impact communication?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• oTree
• ORSEE

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