Intention or request: the impact of message structures

DOI10.3390/g12010012zbMath1478.91030OpenAlexW3129128760MaRDI QIDQ2052492

Siyu Wang, Timothy Flannery

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010012

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcommunicationcheap talklying aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Experiments on communication in games: introduction to the special issue

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• oTree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Bare promises: an experiment
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• A model of pre-game communication
• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Promises and Partnership
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals

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