Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
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Publication:3655345
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00559.xzbMath1186.91046MaRDI QIDQ3655345
Publication date: 7 January 2010
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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