De-biasing strategic communication
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2667271
Recommendations
Cites work
- A survey on continuous elliptical vector distributions
- A Theory of Credibility
- Communication under language barriers
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484411 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intentional vagueness
- Language barriers
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Strategic Information Transmission
- What kind of central bank competence?
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
Cited in
(12)- Public communication with externalities
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Strategic communication with reporting costs
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- When to drop a bombshell
- An example of conflicts of interest as pandering disincentives
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Fomenting conflict
- Naive audience and communication bias
This page was built for publication: De-biasing strategic communication
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2667271)
