De-biasing strategic communication
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Publication:2667271
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.09.001zbMATH Open1478.91025OpenAlexW3201509083MaRDI QIDQ2667271FDOQ2667271
Authors: Tobias Gesche 
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp216.pdf
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Cites Work
- A survey on continuous elliptical vector distributions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Language barriers
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling
- Intentional vagueness
- Communication under language barriers
- What kind of central bank competence?
Cited In (12)
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Public communication with externalities
- Fomenting conflict
- Strategic communication with reporting costs
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Naive audience and communication bias
- When to drop a bombshell
- An example of conflicts of interest as pandering disincentives
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
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