A Theory of Credibility

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Publication:3685519

DOI10.2307/2297732zbMath0568.90004OpenAlexW1980165907MaRDI QIDQ3685519

Joel Sobel

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297732




Related Items (39)

Credulity, lies, and costly talkCostly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcementsNaive audience and communication biasComparative cheap talkStarting small to communicateSignaling GamesBuilding trust: the costs and benefits of gradualismDe-biasing strategic communicationPreselection and expert adviceBounded memory and permanent reputationsToo good to be truthful: why competent advisers are firedStarting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of typesA reputation for honestyLimited records and reputation bubblesDynamic strategic information transmissionOptimal policy with credibility concernsHow does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?Repeated communication with private lying costsThe battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological sendersCheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biasesEffective cheap talk with conflicting interestsCrying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warningLearning with bounded memory in gamesCommunication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledgeReceiver's dilemmaIncentive constraints in games with bounded memoryWhen mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interestsMulti-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased expertsPerturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receiversProfessional adviceInformal communicationEvolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationshipsCheap talk can matter in bargainingStag hunt with unknown outside optionsA mathematical model of communication with reputational concernsStarting small and renegotiationTalking to influenceWho benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment




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