A Theory of Credibility
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Publication:3685519
DOI10.2307/2297732zbMath0568.90004OpenAlexW1980165907MaRDI QIDQ3685519
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297732
Related Items (39)
Credulity, lies, and costly talk ⋮ Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements ⋮ Naive audience and communication bias ⋮ Comparative cheap talk ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ Preselection and expert advice ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired ⋮ Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases ⋮ Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests ⋮ Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning ⋮ Learning with bounded memory in games ⋮ Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge ⋮ Receiver's dilemma ⋮ Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory ⋮ When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests ⋮ Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Professional advice ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Cheap talk can matter in bargaining ⋮ Stag hunt with unknown outside options ⋮ A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns ⋮ Starting small and renegotiation ⋮ Talking to influence ⋮ Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver? ⋮ Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
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