A Theory of Credibility
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Publication:3685519
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(50)- Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?
- The practical application of credibility theory
- Decision theoretic foundations of credibility theory
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Starting small and renegotiation
- Preselection and expert advice
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
- Receiver's dilemma
- Stag hunt with unknown outside options
- Starting small to communicate
- Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning
- Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Professional advice
- A course in credibility theory and its applications
- Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
- On the ordering of credibility factors
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- De-biasing strategic communication
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- A reputation for honesty
- Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases
- Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements
- A SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR CREDIBILITY MEASURES
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Learning with bounded memory in games
- Signaling games
- Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Trust between principal and agent based on the sequential reciprocal equilibrium
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Make it 'til you fake it
- Competitive capture of public opinion
- Truth-telling in dynamic reputational cheap talk
- Super-Nash performance
- Advisors with hidden motives
- Informal communication
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Talking to influence
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Comparative cheap talk
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
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